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Abstract 
Western Platinum Refinery Ltd v Hlebela 2015 36 ILJ 2280 (LAC) 
("Hlebela") required the Labour Appeal Court to grapple with 
difficult questions presented by a generic dilemma which 
confronts an employer who is faced with clear evidence of 
recurrent theft of precious minerals but is unable to identify the 
actual culprits, nor are the employees disposed or willing to co-
operate with the employer in tracking down the perpetrator(s). 
Suddenly, the police informed the employer that an employee 
who had accumulated wealth was a person of interest in their 
investigations. However, they could give no information about the 
employee's being engaged, to their knowledge, in particular illegal 
activities.  
Hlebela answered the nagging question: what is the appropriate 
way to discipline an employee who has actual knowledge of the 
wrongdoing of others or who has actual knowledge of information 
which the employee subjectively knows is relevant to unlawful 
conduct against the employer's interests? The categorical answer 
is that the employer should charge the employee with material 
breach of the duty of good faith, particularising the knowledge 
allegedly possessed and alleging a culpable non-disclosure.  
Keywords 
Culpable non-disclosure; derivative misconduct; duty of good 
faith; collective misconduct; team misconduct; irregular wealth 
acquisition. 
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1 Introduction 
Modern management decision-making processes in disciplinary matters face 
the ultimate dilemma when serious acts of misconduct have either been 
perpetrated or are currently being perpetrated but the employer is not in a 
position to pinpoint the specific culprit(s). If employees are neither disposed 
nor willing to co-operate with the employer in tracking down those actually 
responsible for the misconduct, the problem is of a significantly broader 
scope. Assume you are the management of a platinum refinery which for 
several years has been experiencing on-going losses of stock. Out of the 
blue, the SAPS informs you that one of your employees is a person of 
interest in police investigations. They give no information about the 
employee's being engaged, to their knowledge, in particular illegal activities. 
Rather, the police give you information about the "wealth" amassed by the 
employee in question and his immediate family. The wealth acquired by the 
employee in question and his close family is disproportionate to his modest 
salary; thus, the only logical, natural and plausible explanation for such 
affluence is that it was sourced from the proceeds of the theft of platinum.  
In the particular case sophisticated security surveillance was placed on the 
suspected employee and the police information was used to track down the 
assets known to be possessed by the employee or members of his family. 
Company management also chose to examine the employer's security 
clocking systems. A compendium of the suspected employee's movements 
for several days revealed frequent movements through different sections of 
the plant, including sections in which he had no clearly apparent reason to 
be. What was particularly disturbing was the fact that the employee had a 
card that allowed him entry into sites which he was ostensibly forbidden to 
visit.  
What should the employer do in view of the employee's suspicious 
movements? How should the employer formulate disciplinary charges 
against the alleged culprit? Can the employer charge the employee with 
culpable involvement in theft and the non-disclosure of information about 
wrongdoing? Is derivative misconduct the appropriate charge against the 
employee for not disclosing his personal financial information, which the 
employer suspected would implicate him in irregular wealth acquisition? In 
Western Platinum Refinery Ltd v Hlebela1 Sutherland JA was confronted 
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with a similar hydra-headed problem: what is the appropriate way to 
discipline an employee who has actual knowledge of the wrongdoing of 
others or who has actual knowledge of information which the employee 
subjectively knows is relevant to unlawful conduct against the employer's 
interests?  
2 The issues in the Hlebela case  
In Hlebela, Sutherland JA gave the court's answer to such a management 
dilemma. The scenario delineated above was the exact situation that arose 
in Hlebela. The employee, an operator at the appellant's platinum refinery, 
was charged in the terms described above, with culpable involvement in the 
theft and with the non-disclosure of information about wrongdoing. The 
charge for which he was dismissed is better reproduced than paraphrased: It 
reads as follows: 
It is alleged that you have knowledge of the enormous losses of PMGS at PMR 
but you made no full and frank disclosure to PMR about what you know that 
could assist PMR in its investigations herein. 
The reference to PMR is to the employer, and PMGS refers to Platinum 
Group Metals. The "losses" refer to unexplained losses of stock over 
decades. The employee was charged and tried in a disciplinary hearing on 
an additional charge of culpable participation in the theft of PMGs. He was 
acquitted on the charge of culpable participation in the theft of PMGs on the 
basis that evidence of his wealth did not prove culpable participation in the 
theft.  
At arbitration the dismissal of Hlebela was held to be fair. The employee took 
the arbitrator's award on review and the Labour Court overturned the 
arbitrator's finding and declared that the dismissal was substantively unfair, 
but considered reinstatement an inappropriate remedy, and instead granted 
compensation equivalent to 12 months' salary. The mixed result satisfied 
neither the employee nor the employer. Accordingly, the employer appealed 
against the decision setting aside the arbitration award, and the employee, in 
turn, cross-appealed against the compensation order, seeking a substituted 
order of reinstatement. The focal issue in Hlebela was the substantive 
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fairness of a conviction for misconduct allegedly perpetrated by the 
respondent. 
3 The meaning of the term derivative misconduct 
Before turning to the fact-specific issues arising for determination, 
Sutherland JA found it imperative to deal with the elusive concept of 
"derivative misconduct", which is interwoven with the non-disclosure 
species of that concept, "because ... serious confusion existed among 
those responsible for instituting disciplinary process about the concept and 
how to apply it appropriately".2 Elucidating the distinction between the 
relevant terms is particularly significant because it is difficult to draw a 
distinction between the interrelated concepts of common purpose,3 
collective guilt,4 collective misconduct5 and team misconduct. Divergent 
opinions have been expressed in an array of cases concerning the 
interpretation of these terms.6  
The genesis of the concept of derivative misconduct7 and the entry into the 
South African labour law lexicon of the phrases "derived justification" and 
"derived violation of trust and confidence" can be traced to the seminal case 
of Chauke v Leeson Motors.8 Cameron JA (as he then was) with customary 
lucidity pertinently captured the difficult problem of fair employment 
practice by posing the following question: "Where misconduct necessitating 
disciplinary action is proved, but management is unable to pinpoint the 
perpetrator or perpetrators, in what circumstances will it be permissible to 
dismiss a group of workers which incontestably includes them?"9 In that 
case, the real issue was the reliable identification of the culprits who 
committed several acts of sabotage over a period of time. The management 
was unable to pinpoint the perpetrators. A request to the staff to divulge the 
relevant information was issued to avoid any further sabotage but drew no 
                                            
2  Hlebela para [4]. 
3  For a perceptive exposition on the doctrine of common purpose, see Cameron 2004 
SALJ 580-586. 
4  Okpaluba ''Current Issues of Fair Procedure" 18-22, on file with the author. 
5  Le Roux 2011 CLL 101. 
6  Generally NSGAWU v Coin Security 1997 1 BLLR 85 (IC); Stocklush (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Meadow Meats v FAWU obo Setouto 2015 ZALCCT 61 para [4]; NUM v RSA 
Geological Services (A Division of De Beers) 2004 25 ILJ 410 (ARB) ("RSA 
Geological Services I"); RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers) v Grogan 
2008 29 ILJ 406 (LC) ("RSA Geological Services II"); Foschini Group v Maidi 2010 
31 ILJ 1787 (LAC) para [46] ("Foschini"); FEDCRAW and Snip Trading (Pty) Ltd 
2001 22 ILJ 1945 (ARB) para [32] ("Snip Trading").  
7  FAWU v ABI Ltd 1994 15 ILJ 1057 (LAC) 1063B. 
8  Chauke v Leeson Motors 1998 19 ILJ 1441 (LAC) ("Leeson Motors"). 
9  Leeson Motors para [27]. 
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response. Eventually, an ultimatum was issued that any further sabotage in 
respect of which the individual perpetrators remained unidentified would 
result in the dismissal of all employees. In the end, the entire workforce was 
dismissed. The dismissal was upheld by the Industrial Court and on appeal. 
In upholding the dismissal, the Labour Court noted that it was properly to be 
inferred that the 20 workers were culpably involved in the "primary 
misconduct", i.e. the actual acts of sabotage. Sutherland JA explained that 
the judgement did not necessary imply that the evidence did not warrant a 
conclusion that each and every worker physically sabotaged a vehicle in the 
workshop "but that all had associated themselves with the sabotage: an 
instance of common purpose".10 
In coming to the conclusion that the employer could not be blamed for 
treating the misconduct as a collective issue, the court had approached the 
problem from two angles, a strategy which no doubt took a cue from the 
Appellate Division's earlier approach with regard to collective dismissals in 
strike situations.11 The first category in the Labour Appeal Court's 
formulation is where one of only two employees is known to have been 
involved in "major irreversible destructive action" but management is unable 
to pinpoint which of them is responsible for the act. In this instance, the 
employer may be entitled to dismiss both of them, including the innocent 
one, where all avenues of investigation have been exhausted. The 
rationalisation here is that of operational requirement, namely that action is 
necessary to save the life of the enterprise.  
The second category results in dismissal on the ground of misconduct where 
management may have sufficient grounds for inferring that the whole group 
is responsible for the misconduct or is involved in it. In postulating a two-fold 
justification in this regard, the Court created an implied duty on an employee 
in such a group, including the actual perpetrators, to assist management in 
bringing the guilty to book, a duty akin to that of exemplifying the trust and 
confidence essential to the employment relationship, a breach of which in 
itself justifies dismissal.12 In Leeson Motors Cameron JA further held that this 
derived justification is wide enough "to encompass those innocent of it, but 
who through their silence make themselves guilty of a derivative violation of 
                                            
10  Hlebela para [6]. 
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in MAN Truck & Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd v United African Motor & Allied Workers Union 
1991 12 ILJ 181 (Arb) 192F-H; Zondi v The President of the Industrial Court 1997 8 
BLLR 984 (LAC) 1002A-D. 
12  Leeson Motors para [33]. 
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trust and confidence".13 In effect, the price the innocent pays in this 
circumstance is for choosing to exercise his or her right to remain silent. The 
second justification in respect of this category of misconduct is the inference 
of involvement whereby the employer is entitled to infer that all the 
employees either participated in the misconduct or lent their support to it 
positively or passively.14 In both of these instances, the employer is entitled 
to discipline the employees for misconduct as a group. 
In RSA Geological Services I15 Grogan established that proof of derivative 
misconduct is subject to two requirements: first, that the employee knew or 
could have acquired knowledge of the wrongdoing, and second, that the 
employee failed without justification to disclose that knowledge to the 
employer, or to take reasonable steps to help the employer to acquire that 
knowledge. Considering the requirements for proof of derivative 
misconduct espoused by Grogan in RSA Geological Services I, 
Sutherland JA noted that "the notion that breach of good faith occurs if an 
employee 'could have acquired knowledge of wrongdoing'" seems to be 
"too broadly or loosely stated".16 While he properly recognised that 
"negligent ignorance of circumstances of which an employee ought to 
have been aware should found a basis for culpability within the compass 
of negligence itself rather than intrude into the realm of breaches of good 
faith", he then articulated the applicable threshold in the following way:17  
... actual knowledge is required to trigger the duty to speak up, the employer 
must prove actual knowledge not merely putative knowledge, and no room 
exists for considerations of negligent ignorance. Secondly, the notion that a 
refusal to disclose, pursuant to a duty of good faith, might be capable of 
justification in order to avoid guilt of a breach of the duty of good faith, 
seems to me to be incorrect. Logically, there is no room for such defence ... 
the explanation for non-disclosure may afford, in a given case, mitigation of 
the culpability, but it would not stretch to a defence to the charge. 
In RSA Geological Services II Pillay J, dealing with the nature of derivative 
misconduct, observed that "the employer must prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the employees knew or must have known about the 
principal misconduct and elected without justification not to disclose what 
they knew".18  
                                            
13  Leeson Motors para [27]. 
14  FAWU v ABI Ltd 1994 15 ILJ 1057 (LAC) 1063B. 
15  RSA Geological Services I paras [29-30]. 
16  Hlebela para [17]. 
17  Hlebela para [17]. 
18  RSA Geological Services II para [49]. 
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The intriguing question then becomes what is the appropriate way to 
discipline an employee who has actual knowledge of the wrongdoing of 
others or who has actual knowledge of information which the employee 
subjectively knows is relevant to unlawful conduct against the employer's 
interests? To a question of this nature there is only one possible answer, 
according to Sutherland JA:19  
… to charge that employee with material breach of the duty of good faith, 
particularising the knowledge allegedly possessed and alleging a culpable 
non-disclosure. This observation does not mean that the gravamen of such a 
charge might not also be articulated in another way, provided it is plain what 
is alleged and why it is alleged to be culpable.  
If we return to the facts and merits of the case against Hlebela, it is 
important to recall that the disciplinary outcome was that the evidence of 
his wealth did not prove his culpable participation in the theft. He was, 
however, convicted of the non-disclosure charge. Apparently the 
"information" not divulged, relied upon to convict him, was information 
specified in demands, made to him after he had been charged, to reveal 
details of his personal financial affairs. He declined, acting on the union 
advice that he was under no obligation to do so. 
For an employer to make ex post facto demands to the employee to 
disclose information about his or her personal finances in order to 
substantiate a charge of non-disclosure is perhaps more problematic than 
appears at first sight. After all, Hlebela is somewhat unusual in that the 
demands made to reveal personal information were not for the sort of 
information that would constitute the substance of culpable non-disclosure 
pursuant to a duty of good faith. It is arguable that a resort to undisclosed 
information relied on to validate the charge was not about wrongdoing and 
resulting stock losses, but about his personal wealth. It seems correct to 
assert that the demands made to disclose personal information were in the 
nature of a demand for the discovery of information which ought to be 
ventilated in the disciplinary hearing, or at least in the arbitration.  
The difficulty of grasping what the prosecutors in the disciplinary enquiry 
could have had in mind when the charge was put to the employee 
weighed heavily with the Labour Appeal Court:20  
Even an unreasonable refusal to disclose the employee's personal finances 
and a reasonable inference that he did so to conceal the manner of their 
acquisition is not capable of being logically linked to the fact that he has 
                                            
19  Hlebela para [20]. 
20  Hlebela para [28]. 
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actual knowledge of wrongdoing by others. When the employer is thwarted 
by a non-disclosure to procure information, it cannot be argued that the 
employer can infer proof of what it suspects. 
The issues posed by the ex post facto demand that the employee reveal 
his personal financial affairs can be seen as part of the frailties in the 
employer's evidence to warrant dismissal for culpable non-disclosure. In 
the present case, the Labour Appeal Court noted that 
… the cross-examination served to elicit answers which went some way to 
explaining that the so-called wealth was the fruits of the efforts of not only 
himself but also his wife, his mother and the occupants of a house who 
contributed to the bond payments on the house.21 
There can be no doubt that the explanations proffered by the employee 
may have been evasive and inadequate, but it is also manifestly plain that 
the inadequacy of the evidential material implicating Hlebela fatally 
undermined the prosecution case. Asking about the employee's suspicious 
movements around and about the plant did not yield any incriminating 
evidence concerning the alleged "network" with other co-conspirators. One 
reason for this was that it was downright speculation. There was no 
compelling case against the employee. As Sutherland JA wryly observed, 
"Even cross-examiners need more than straw if they are asked to make 
bricks".22 
So, in Hlebela it was held that the award convicting him was one no 
reasonable arbitrator could have reached upon a proper appreciation of 
the evidence adduced. After the award was set aside, that left the issue of 
relief and cross-appeal for determination. It may be recalled that the 
employee cross-appealed against the compensation order and sought an 
order of reinstatement. 
It is important to stress that the conclusion arrived at in respect of refusing 
reinstatement was premised on what the court below considered to be the 
employee's manifest deceit as revealed during cross-examination. It is well 
established that reinstatement is not a competent remedy where 
dishonesty is involved as it generally results in the irretrievable breakdown 
of the trust relationship rendering continued employment intolerable.23  
A careful perusal of the record showed that the factual foundation upon 
which the Labour Court had based its conclusion was unsound. For 
                                            
21  Hlebela para [29].  
22  Hlebela para [29].  
23  For serious reflection on this topic see Okpaluba 1999 SALJ 116; Smit 2011 De Jure 
49; Rycroft 2012 ILJ 2271. 
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instance, the judge in the court below had held that Hlebela contradicted 
himself by denying he had a business, but when the name of Ceba 
Construction Products CC was put to him, he conceded that he was the 
owner. If this was so, then Hlebela lied, and when caught out he was 
forced to retract his lie. What lay behind the faulty conclusion of the 
Labour Court was the pervasive obfuscation about what was being asked 
and what the answers were supposedly addressing. To illustrate, "the 
answer 'no' is probably given to the question about what means other than 
his wages does he have, and was not offered to the question about having 
another business".24 Since the decision of the Labour Court to decline 
reinstatement rested on shaky foundation, the Labour Appeal Court 
concluded that re-instatement was the appropriate remedy. This writer 
would not dissent from this, since the Labour Court's factual determination 
that the employee was dishonest was not borne out by the evidence. 
4 Commentary 
Hlebela is by far the most important decision on the thorny issue of 
derivative misconduct and its forms since Leeson Motors. If the employer 
proceeds by way of derivative misconduct, the employees' misconduct is 
founded in the fact that the non-participating employees, by failing to take 
positive action and assisting their employer so that those employees that 
actually participated in the unlawful behaviour could be brought to book, 
breached their duty of good faith and trust towards their employer.25 By 
contrast, if the employer opts for the path of culpable non-disclosure, the 
misconduct is predicated on the general duty of good faith to disclose the 
wrongdoing of others, not on culpable participation, even in a lesser 
degree than the other perpetrators. These two authorities, alongside RSA 
Geological Services I and II; and SAMWU obo Abrahams v City of Cape 
Town26 furnish the ground rules for derivative misconduct, collective 
misconduct, team misconduct and culpable non-disclosure. The common 
thread running through these cases is the emphasis on the significance of 
                                            
24  Hlebela para [36]. 
25  The emergence of an expansive duty to act in good faith is a reflection of the 
employee’s vulnerable position within inherently asymmetric contractual relation with 
the employer. In the context of larger trends it partly correlates with the accumulating 
assault on the pro-regulatory stance of labour law. For an overview of a range of 
sources exploring this theme, see generally, Klare 1981 Berkeley J Emp & Lab L 
450-482; Klare 1985 Md L Rev 731-840 and Klare "Countervailing Workers' Power" 
63; Epstein 1983Yale LJ 1357; Stone 2001 UCLA L Rev 519; Collins 2001 ILJ (UK) 
17; Mitchell Redefining Labour Law; Deakin and Wilkinson Law of the Labour 
Market; Arup et al Labour Law. 
26  SAMWU obo Abrahams v City of Cape Town 2011 11 BLLR 1106 (LC) ("SAMWU 
obo Abrahams"). 
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proving on a balance of probabilities that the employees knew or must 
have known about the primary misconduct and opted without justification 
not to divulge what they knew. 
As already noted, derivative misconduct cannot diminish the standard of 
proof an employer must still comply with to establish the existence of 
misconduct.27 The central issue is that employees against whom derivative 
misconduct is invoked must be properly identified. An instructive but 
simple illustration is provided by Snyman AJ in SATAWU v Collet Armed 
Security Services CC:28 
Assuming an employer has 100 employees and during a strike some 
employees participated in unlawful behaviour. Does this now mean that all 
employees, just because they are employed by the same employer and may 
have participated in the strike, can now be held accountable for this 
misconduct by certain individuals on the basis of derivative misconduct just 
because they are all employed by the same employer and participated in the 
same strike? Surely not. What if a particular group of employees were not 
even present when the unlawful behaviour took place and never witnessed 
or was aware of the same?  
This is perhaps seen as the dividing line between derivative misconduct 
and collective guilt in that the application of derivative misconduct requires 
that individual employees must at least still be given the opportunity to 
explain why they should not be held accountable in terms thereof. 
The judgement in Hlebela authoritatively elucidated the abstract issue of 
justified dismissal for non-disclosure which was not dealt with in respect of 
Leeson Motors. The real issue in matters concerning culpable non-
disclosure is that the undisclosed knowledge must be actual and not 
imputed or constructive knowledge of wrongdoing. Proof of actual 
knowledge is likely to be established by drawing inferences from the 
evidence adduced. Therefore non-disclosure must be deliberate. 
Accordingly, actual knowledge of wrongdoing triggers a duty to disclose. If 
there has been a request for information about known wrongdoing or 
suspected wrongdoing, culpability for non-disclosure is simply aggravated. 
Aside from clarifying the distinction between derivative misconduct and 
culpable non-disclosure, Hlebela invites consideration of the impossible 
distinction between the notions of collective guilt, collective misconduct 
and team misconduct. It is worth bearing in mind that item 7(a) of the 
Code of Good Practice requires the employer to prove on a balance of 
                                            
27  NUM v Besent, Grogan v RSA Geological Services (A Division of De Beers 
Consolidated Mines Ltd) 2010 ZALAC 12 paras [54-58] ("Besent"). 
28  SATAWU v Collet Armed Security Services CC 2013 ZALCJHB 301 para [61]. 
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probabilities that the employee was actually guilty of misconduct. This may 
be easily accomplished in some cases and prove impossible in others. 
The proof is particularly difficult in cases where several employees are 
involved in the same misconduct, as in collective misconduct. In such 
circumstances, it is required that it be proved on a balance of probabilities 
that each employee was actually involved before disciplinary action can be 
taken against them. In other words, this means that there needs to be 
established that the employee was actually involved and that no one 
should be convicted of misconduct in the absence of discernible proof that 
the employee was involved in the identified acts, merely because he or 
she was part of a collective. 
One should perhaps not be surprised that those responsible for initiating 
disciplinary proceedings have found these concepts fraught with 
misconception. In this writer's view, the very existence of derivative 
misconduct, collective misconduct and team misconduct is a reflection of 
the need to develop innovative ways of navigating the need to deal with 
collective guilt. According to one line of reasoning, the employer cannot 
dismiss the workers collectively because the concept of collective guilt is 
"wholly foreign to our system and repugnant to the requirements of natural 
justice".29 The main objection to the collective guilt approach is that those 
employees who did not participate in the unlawful act or who did not 
associate themselves with the behaviour of the perpetrators will be punished 
along with the wrongdoers. The consequence therefore is that the collective 
guilt approach endorses the dismissal of innocent employees.  
SAMWU obo Abrahams required the court to consider whether the guilt of 
a group of employees in respect of a road blockade could be inferred from 
the fact that they were present at the Cape Town Civic Centre and had 
given no plausible explanation of how they got there. In this case the 
applicant union had mobilised its members and planned to move in a 
convoy along the N2 to the Civic Centre. The plan was carried out as 
intended. However, the identification of the employees partaking in the 
unlawful work stoppage could be made only at the Civic Centre. The 
respondent dealt with the matter from a collective misconduct approach 
and the dismissed applicants were accorded the opportunity at the 
disciplinary enquiry to explain why collective dismissal should not be 
applied to them. They declined to do so, relying on the union's advice. It 
was held that the dismissal of the applicants was not unfair as they acted 
                                            
29  NSGAWU v Coin Security 1997 1 BLLR 85 (IC) 91F-G ("NSCAWU"). See also NUM 
v Durban Deep Roodepoort Ltd 1987 8 ILJ 156 (IC). 
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as a cohesive group with a common purpose. It was reasonable to find 
that on a balance of probabilities the applicants had been involved in the 
event along the N2 freeway. 
A useful way to explore the impossible distinction between the collective guilt 
approach on the one hand and collective misconduct and team misconduct 
on the other is to review the authorities concerning stock loss (the so called 
"shrinkage action plan") and collective team control, where it is possible to 
hold individual employees liable as a group. In line with this reasoning, what 
Item 9 of the Code of Good Practice requires in terms of a charge of poor 
work performance, it is contended, is that the employee be made aware that 
he/she has failed to meet the standard of performance set by the employer 
and that he/she be given the opportunity to meet that standard, failing which 
dismissal will follow as an appropriate sanction.30  
Grogan has written extensively on and refined the concept of team 
misconduct31 and handed down seminal arbitration awards.32 In situations 
of team misconduct Grogan points out that it is permissible to act against the 
entire team if each member has a role to play in attaining the performance 
standard set for the team. If the standard is not attained each member must 
be given an opportunity to explain the team's failure; the person to whom the 
explanations are given must be objectively satisfied that the team's failure 
cannot be blamed on any particular member of that team.33 The rationale for 
this approach is that it is often extremely difficult to prove that stock losses 
are caused by a particular employee.34 In the case of Foschini, five 
employees were charged and dismissed for collective misconduct for 
failing to secure company assets, in the wake of massive shrinkage. 
Relying on the notion of team misconduct espoused in Snip Trading, the 
arbitrator concluded that if employees' in a small store are unable to give 
an explanation for massive stock loss other than saying it was beyond 
their control, the only logical inference is that they are guilty. The 
arbitrator's conclusion that such a policy was not unfair was upheld by the 
Labour Appeal Court. On this analysis, the employees are held 
accountable for a general stock loss because an employer is entitled to 
introduce strict rules in order to safeguard its assets. 
                                            
30  SACCAWU v Pep Stores 1998 19 ILJ 939 (CCMA) 946G. 
31  Grogan Dismissal 167-171. 
32  Generally Besent; NSCAWU; Snip Trading; RSA Geological Services I. 
33  Snip Trading paras [37-41]; Tawusa obo Tau v Barplats Mine Ltd (Crocodile River 
Mine) 2009 30 ILJ 2791 (LC) para [50]. 
34  True Blue Foods Ltd t/a Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) v CCMA 2015 2 BLLR 194 (LC) 
paras [44-50]; Metro Cash & Carry Ltd v Tshehla 1997 1 BLLR 35 (LAC) 41G. 
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5 Conclusion  
There can be no doubt that the issues in Hlebela are illustrative of the 
employee's all-encompassing duty of good faith to rat on the culprits. It can 
be seen from the preceding discussion that those in charge of the 
disciplinary process struggled to come to grips with the interrelated 
concept of derivate misconduct and culpable non-disclosure. Hlebela 
provides guidance on how to formulate disciplinary charges against an 
employee who has actual knowledge of the wrongdoing of others or who has 
actual knowledge of information which the employee subjectively knows is 
relevant to unlawful conduct against the employer's interests. In such a 
situation, the employee can be charged with a material breach of the duty of 
good faith, particularising the knowledge allegedly possessed and alleging a 
culpable non-disclosure. Often the wrongdoing in itself might not be known 
to the employer. It follows that the disclosure of information relevant to the 
wrongdoing, pursuant to the duty of good faith, is not dependent upon a 
specific request for relevant information. Conversely, where a request for 
information about known transgression or suspected transgressions has in 
fact been made, culpability for the non-disclosure is simply aggravated. In 
short, the overarching principle to be derived from the judgement of 
Sutherland JA is that non-disclosure may afford, in a given case, mitigation 
of the culpability, but is per se not a defence to a charge of a breach of a 
duty of good faith. 
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